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Comment
Larson v. Dunn: Toward a Reasoned
Response to Parental Kidnapping
Jessica Larson's mother, Loree Dunn, hid Jessica from the
law and her father for seven years.' Their flight began when a
judge in southern Minnesota awarded custody of Jessica, then
two years old, to Dunn's ex-husband, John Larson.2 It ended
the day agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
burst into their home in Washington state.3 After the federal
government reunited Jessica with her father, he sued Jessica's
mother and the girl's grandparents for interfering with his cus-
todial rights.4 The trial judge dismissed the suit for failing to
state a claim,5 but the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed,6
thereby joining a number of states that have judicially created a
tort for parental kidnapping.7 The Minnesota Supreme Court
reversed again,8 bucking a nationwide trend.9 The court deter-
mined that the state would not serve the best interests of chil-
dren by allowing their parents to use the courts to battle
endlessly over family matters.10
The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision was a watershed.
All thirteen state supreme courts that had previously addressed
this issue had concluded that creating the new tort furthered
1. Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 41 (Minn. 1990).
2. Id-
3. d. at 42.
4. Id; see infra notes 124-27 and accompanying text (describing Larson's
claims).
5. See infra note 128 and accompanying text (describing the trial judge's
decision).
6. See infra note 129 and accompanying text (describing the court of ap-
peals decision).
7. See infra notes 93-104 and accompanying text (describing the trend to-
ward adoption of the tort of custodial interference).
8. Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 47; see infra notes 130-42 and accompanying
text (describing the Minnesota Supreme Court's ruling).
9. See infra notes 94-104 and accompanying text (describing previous de-
cisions by state high courts elsewhere in the nation).
10. See infra notes 130-42 and accompanying text (describing the Minne-
sota Supreme Court's reasoning).
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public policy objectives.' Unlike the Minnesota court, how-
ever, few of the other courts faced suits that one parent
brought against the other after the kidnapped child had re-
turned home and had begun adjusting, once again, to a new
family setting.-2 Most of the litigation in other courts had re-
sulted from efforts to recover still missing children' 3 or from
attempts to win damages from non-parent, third-parties who
helped carry out the abductions.' 4 This Comment demonstrates
that the Minnesota court's focus on the abducted child's welfare
adds an important new dimension to the tort of custodial inter-
ference with children. Part I provides the context for the tort's
growing acceptance, describing the extent and causes of the pa-
rental kidnapping problem and previous measures designed to
address it. Part II analyzes the Minnesota court's novel ap-
proach to the tort. Part III praises the direction of the Minne-
sota approach, but criticizes the court's blanket rejection of the
tort. The Comment concludes with a proposal that the state
legislature adopt a limited custodial interference tort that
would aid in the return of children abducted for the long term,
but would minimize further damage to nuclear family relation-
ships when children have returned to their custodial parents.
I. CHILD KIDNAPPING IN THE UNITED STATES
Although experts agree that child kidnapping represents a
serious problem,15 researchers have conducted few studies pro-
viding accurate information on how many parents abduct their
children. 6 Frequently cited estimates suggest that anywhere
11. See infra note 95 and accompanying text (listing state high courts that
judicially established the tort of custodial interference).
12. Only two other state high courts faced suits between parents after the
children returned home. See Montgomery v. Crum, 199 Ind. 660, 664, 161 N.E.
251, 254 (1928); Wood v. Wood, 338 N.W.2d 123, 123 (Iowa 1983); see also infra
notes 104-11 and accompanying text (describing the Wood and Montgomery
decisions).
13. See infra note 103 and accompanying text (describing suit filed while
children were still missing).
14. See infra notes 96-102 and accompanying text (listing the actions
against non-parent defendants).
15. See S. ABRAHMS, CHILDREN IN THE CROSSFIRE: THE TRAGEDY OF PA-
RENTAL KIDNAPING 5 (1983); M. AGOPIAN, PARENTAL CHILD-STEALING 1 (1981);
P. HOFF, INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES 37 (1984);
L. KARP & C. KARP, DOMESTIc TORTS: FAMILY VIOLENCE, CONFLICTS & SEX-
UAL ABUSE § 5.01 (1989).
16. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MISSING, ABDUCTED, RUNAWAY AND THROWNAWAY CHIL-
DREN IN AMERICA at i (1990) [hereinafter MISSING CHILDREN].
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from 25,000 to 750,000 children are kidnapped annually by one
of their parents.17 Some studies report that seventy to ninety
percent of these children never return.18 Many of these statis-
tics, however, are implausible on their face, suggesting as many
as forty children per state disappear each day.19 A recent tele-
phone survey by the U.S. Department of Justice suggests that
very few parents kidnap their children for a long term.20 The
17. The most frequently cited statistic is 100,000 children per year. See
Campbell, The Tort of Custodial Interlerence - Toward a More Complete
Remedy to Parental Kidnappings, 1983 U. hL L. REV. 229, 229; Note, Abduc-
tion of Child by Noncustodial Parent- Damages for Custodial Parent's Mental
Distress, 46 Mo. L. REV. 829, 829 (1981); Comment, Parental Kidnapping in
Minnesota, 13 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 985, 985 (1987).
18. See Note, Tortious Interference with Custody: An Action to Supple-
ment Iowa Statutory Deterrents to Child Snatching, 68 IoWA L. REV. 495, 495
(1983).
19. Common sense suggests that 750,000 children cannot be kidnapped
each year by one of their parents. Such a number would equal an average of
15,000 children per state per year, 290 children per state per week, or an in-
credible forty children per state per day. Over a ten-year period, parents
would kidnap 150,000 children from an average state. In Minnesota, this
would be an extraordinary number of children, far more than, for example,
are enrolled in the state's largest public school system. The Minneapolis
school system has a total kindergarten through twelfth grade enrollment of
about 40,500 children. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT DrwSION, MINNEAPOLIS
PUBLIC SCHOOLS, REPORT OF THE ANNUAL SIGHT COUNT OF STUDENTS AND
PERSONNEL 2 (1989).
The numbers are even more absurd coupled with the supposed large per-
centages of kidnapped children who are never heard from again. See supra
note 18 and accompanying text (asserting that 70% to 90% of the children kid-
napped by one of their parents never return). The "conservative" 70% esti-
mate would mean that, over a ten-year period, 105,000 children per state would
vanish at the hands of parental kidnappers. Nationwide, over the period of a
single decade, parental kidnapping would account for 5,250,000 missing chil-
dren who never return. By contrast, during 1981, 1982, and 1983, the FBI's
missing children computer logged 2,142 parental abduction complaints. P.
HOFF, supra note 15, at 80.
The calculation of 5.2 million missing children per decade seems particu-
larly unrealistic juxtaposed with the number of American casualties in the
Vietnam War. In the 12 years of conflict, 46,000 Americans died in combat. 29
THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 264 (15th ed. 1989). Indeed, the 750,000
children supposedly kidnapped by their parents each year is far greater than
the number of Americans serving in Vietnam during the peak of the conflict
- 500,000. IM
20. MISSING CHILDREN, supra note 16, at xi. Researchers at the Univer-
sity of New Hampshire conducted the study for the Department of Justice at
the request of Congress. Id at i. A telephone survey of 34,822 randomly se-
lected households formed the centerpiece of the study. Id. at vii. Researchers
interviewed 10,544 caretakers about the experiences of 20,505 children. Id.
The report concluded that missing children make up five distinct sets of
problems: children abducted by family members, children abducted by non-
family members, runaways, throwaways, and children missing because they
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Justice Department survey estimates that each year 354,100
children, typically girls between the ages of two and eleven, are
kept by one of their parents, at least overnight, in violation of a
custody order.2 ' Of these, all but a small percentage of the chil-
dren soon return to their custodial parent.22 Most episodes last
two days to a week;, s only ten percent continue for a month or
more;2 and less than one percent of the children actually
vanish.2
A. REASONS FOR PARENTAL KIDNAPPING
The parental kidnapping problem arises, in part,
from today's divorce climate in America.2 Divorce rates
began skyrocketing in the mid-1960s2 as sex roles chang-
were lost, injured or for some other reason. Id. at vi-viL It also concluded
that many of the missing children are not literally missing; their caretakers
knew where they were but were experiencing difficulty retrieving them. Id.
Although the authors concluded that family abductions are a larger problem
than previously thought, their statistical evidence suggests otherwise. The sur-
vey found that thousands of parents violate custody orders by failing to turn
over the children to the other parents at court-ordered times, but few of these
cases resulted in long term separations. See ifim notes 22-25 and accompany-
ing text (describing the incidence of long term abductions).
21. MISSING CHILDREN, supra note 16, at xi. Many of these delays re-
turning children occurred in January and August at the conclusion of vaca-
tions. Id. Indeed, custodial parents knew the whereabouts of their "missing"
children, at least part of the time, in 83% of the cases. ICE at xxviL Caretaker
parents contacted police in only about 40% of the cases, id. at xii, and con-
tacted lawyers only about half the time. I&
22. Id. at xi.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. Even the Justice Department's conclusion that 3,500 children van-
ish each year at the hands of parental abductors seems overstated. That figure
translates to 70 children vanishing, and not returning, per state per year, or
slightly more than one each week.
26. M. AGOPiAN, supra note 15, at 24-25. Parental kidnapping, however, is
not a new phenomena in the United States. The magnitude of the problem,
however, is new. A handful of early American court cases reflect a child ab-
duction problem, but the majority of these cases result from parents bringing
suit over the seduction of a daughter for immoral purposes. See Magee v. Hol-
land, 27 N.J.L. 86, 95 (1858) (a father's suit over the abduction of his three chil-
dren, ages two to six, by their mother and her brother).
27. Norton & Moorman, Current Trends in Marriage and Divorce among
American Women, 49 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 3 (1987); see also Campbell, supra
note 17, at 229.
Divorce is now very common. About one-fourth of all women between
the ages of 20 and 54 who have been married also have been divorced. Norton
& Moorman, supra, at 4. Roughly the same percentage of children now live
with but one parent, and about 60% will spend at least part of their childhood
in a single-parent home. Minneapolis Star Tribune, Jan. 21, 1988, at 12A, col. 1
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ed,28 more women moved into the work force,-9 and states
lifted legal obstacles to ending marriage.30 With six out of ten
American children living in a single-parent household at some
point in childhood,31 vast numbers of families provide the struc-
tural opportunity for potential parental kidnappers.
Another component of the problem results from the unfor-
tunate tendency of matrimonial law innovations to place chil-
dren at the center of their parents' disputes.3 2 States no longer
require petitioners to prove grounds for divorce, 33 a require-
ment that some petitioners had used to punish marital miscon-
duct.3 Abandoning this requirement has removed the courts as
forums for angry parents to use to aim their hostility directly at
each other.35 Instead, many parents transfer their rage over di-
vorce to custody battles, drawing their children into the
disputes.36
(quoting Arlene F. Salutero of the U.S. Census Bureau's Marriage and Family
Statistics Branch).
28. Minneapolis Star Tribune, July 16, 1990, at 1E, col. 1 (quoting Con-
stance Sorrentino, economist for the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of
Labor Statistics).
29. Id. This allowed more women to live independently of their husbands.
I&
30. C. FOOTE, R LEVY & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY
LAw 580-83 (3d ed. 1985).
31. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (describing divorce rates).
32. See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text (describing litigation
trends that place children at the center of parental divorce hostility).
33. Traditionally, all U.S. jurisdictions permitted couples to divorce only
on proof of statutory grounds such as adultery, desertion, cruelty, conviction
for a crime or drunkenness. C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, supra note 30, at
543-44.
Because the traditional fault-based approach interfered with formally end-
ing relationships, states developed so-called no-fault laws. Id. at 577-84. These
laws permitted divorce if a marriage had irretrievably broken down. Id. Now,
virtually all states have some form of no-fault divorce. Freed & Walker, Fam-
ily Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 18 FAM. L.Q. 369, 379-82 (1985) (as-
serting that only South Dakota does not allow no-fault divorce).
34. C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, supra note 30, at 545.
35. Schepard, Taking Children Seriously: Promoting Cooperative Custody
After Divorce, 64 TEx. L. REv. 687, 698 (1985). Fault determinations often in-
volved battles over intimate family details resulting in "a distasteful, privacy-
invading process that seemed to further alienate the spouses from each other
rather than end the marriage with some sense of dignity and mutual responsi-
bility for its failure." Id. (quoting C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, supra
note 30, at 1073-1101 (containing an imaginary discourse on divorce policy
among a bishop, a law professor, and a doctor)).
36. See M. AGOPIAN, supra note 15, at 26 (noting that compared with divi-
sion of property child custody is "fraught with emotions and controversy").
Agopian also asserted that today parents frequently channel "[tihe hostility of
divorce ... into the ultimate battle of the war between ex-spouses - the
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Relaxing bright-line rules for determining custody has
fueled the litigation fire also. In recent years, state law has ac-
commodated the growing number of fathers seeking custody of
their children 37 by abandoning discriminatory presumptions
that favored awarding young children to their mothers.3s
States replaced this bright-line presumption with flexible stan-
dards that rely on case-by-case factual determinations, 9 further
struggle to retain custody of the child." Id. at xvii; see also L. KARP & C.
KARP, supra note 15, § 5.01, at 194 (noting the explosion of custody litigation
since the 1970s).
37. M. AGOPIAN, supra note 15, at 24-25.
38. Almost all states have abandoned, in custody cases, the presumption
that young children be placed with their mothers. Chambers, Rethinking the
Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REv. 477, 478
(1984). Some of the same sociological changes that led to the demise of fault-
based grounds for divorce also caused the breakdown of the so-called tender
years presumption, which favored mothers over fathers. See Schepard, supra
note 35, at 697. These include changing sex roles and the greater numbers of
women joining the work force. Id. In addition, studies bolstered the impor-
tant contributions fathers should make to the growth of their children. Id.
39. See Chambers, supra note 38, at 478-83 (arguing that the current focus
on awarding custody based on a child's "best interests" is sensible, but in prac-
tice provides "too little guidance to courts").
In Minnesota, state law directs judges to make custody decisions based on
the best interests of the child. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 (West 1990). The
statute lists 12 factors for judges to consider. They are:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to custody;,
(2) the reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the
child to be of sufficient age to express preference;
(3) the child's primary caretaker,
(4) the intimacy of the relationship between each parent and the
child;
(5) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with a parent
or parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly
affect the child's best interests;
(6) the child's adjustment to home, school, and community;
(7) the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory en-
vironment and the desirability of maintaining continuity;
(8) the permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed
custodial home;
(9) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved;
(10) the capacity and disposition of the parties to give the child love,
affection, and guidance, and to continue educating and raising
the child in the child's culture and religion or creed, if any;,
(11) the child's cultural background; and
(12) the affect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if related to
domestic abuse, as defined in section 518B.01, that has occurred
between the parents.
Id. § 518.17 subd. 1.
The 1990 Legislature forbade judges from presuming custody decisions
based on a determination of which parent had acted as the child's primary
caretaker. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 (West Supp. 1991) (Historical and Statu-
tory Notes). This statute nullifies the Minnesota Supreme Court's decisions in
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encouraging litigation between spouses. 40
As a result of the changes, many children face great stress.
Even in the smoothest of divorces, children must cope with
fears of an uncertain future.41 Bitter custody battles can devas-
tate children caught between warring mothers and fathers.42
Similarly, kidnapping gravely injures children.4 3 Nevertheless,
parents who profess to love their children continue to embroil
Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1985), and Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427
N.W.2d 203 (Minn. 1988), in which the court developed the primary caretaker
doctrine. The doctrine states that "when both parents would be suitable custo-
dians, the intimacy of the relationship between the primary parent and the
child should not be disrupted if at all possible." Sejiow, 427 N.W.2d at 211.
The Sejfow court criticized the 12 state law factors for determining best
interests, calling them "somewhat nebulous and often resist[ing] application."
1d. It developed the primary caretaker doctrine to create objective standards
that foster more certainty in litigation. I-
40. Intrafamilial disputes have become so heated that, in order to win cus-
tody, growing numbers of spouses are willing to invent claims that their for-
mer partners sexually abuse the children. Myers, Allegations of Child Sexual
Abuse in Custody and Visitation Litigation" Recommendations for Improved
Fact Finding and Child Protection, 28 J. FAM. L. 1, 20-24 (1989). Myers con-
tends few cases of child abuse are fabricated, except in the divorce setting. Id.
at 22. There, spouses are already suspicious of each other, creating a greater
chance for misperception and deliberate fabrications. Id at 23. Myers cau-
tions, however, that all allegations need thorough evaluation because, even in
the divorce arena, some are true. I& at 23-24.
41. Chambers, supra note 35, at 507; Schepard, supra note 35, at 703-04.
42. R. GARDNER, THE PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME AND THE DDmn.
ENTIATION BETwEEN FABRICATED AND GENUINE CHILD SEX ABUSE 70-97
(1987). Gardner, a noted child psychologist, said before custody battles became
so frequent and so bitter, he rarely saw children who had extraordinary hatred
of one of their parents. Id In the heat of custody battle, too many parents in
effect brainwash their children by manipulating their emotions to turn them
against the other warring parent. I& Gardner described the children as
follows:
These children speak of the hated parent with every vilification and
profanity in their vocabulary - without embarrassment or guilt....
The hatred of the parent often extends to include that parent's com-
plete extended family... Grandparents, who previously had a loving
and tender relationship with the child, who welled up with joy and
pride over their relationship with the child, now find themselves sud-
denly and inexplicably rejected. The child has no guilt over such re-
jection nor does the loved parent.
Id at 70-72.
The Sefkow court said a child's sense of stability is paramount, 427 N.W.2d
at 211, and urged bifurcating divorce proceedings to speed custody determina-
tions and prevent "a parent from manipulating the system to achieve personal
goals which have very little to do with the best interests of the child." Id. at
212.




them in ugly custody fights4 and continue to kidnap them.45
Some experts believe the same anger that fuels protracted cus-
tody battles drives parental kidnapping.4 Others, such as the
drafters of a nationwide divorce law, believe the problem stems
primarily from an unwillingness to accept the court's decision.47
The Justice Department has speculated that some male kidnap-
pers, pessimistic about receiving fair treatment from traditional
family court systems, decide to "take matters into their own
hands."48
B. CONGRESS FIGHTS PARENTAL KIDNAPPING
Congress has passed two pieces of legislation to help par-
ents recover kidnapped children. In 1980, Congress enacted the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA),49 which created
national jurisdictional requirements in divorce cases.50 It sup-
plemented state by state efforts, now largely successful, to re-
move any incentive for parents to spirit their children across
state lines to relitigate custody.5 ' The Act also authorized the
44. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text (describing divorce liti-
gation that places children at the center of disputes between parents).
45. S. ABRAHMS, supra note 15, at 123-24.
46. Id- at 138; M. AGOPLAN, supra note 15, at 25-26. Abrahms argues mal-
ice is the most common motive. S. ABRAHMS, supra note 15, at 126. She
quoted one angry Florida child snatcher complaining that his ex-wife "told me
to go to hell, so I'm telling her the same." fI
47. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. 117
(1968). The prefatory note says: "It is well known that those who lose a court
battle over custody are often unwilling to accept the judgment of the court.
They will remove the child in an unguarded moment or fail to return him af-
ter a visit .... " I&i
Abrahms contends that female child kidnappers often feel a sense of
shame and embarrassment for having lost a child custody battle. S. ABRAHMS,
supra note 15, at 138.
48. MISSING CHILDREN, supra note 16, at xii. The survey noted many of
the kidnappers are men living in the South, where courts are more likely to
award custody to mothers as a matter of course. Id-
49. The PKPA is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1988), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A
(1988) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 606, 674, 1382 (1988).
50. The PKPA attempts to eliminate problems of concurrent jurisdiction
by providing jurisdiction only if "it appears that no other state would have"
home state jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(A)-(B). A new state may
modify another state's custody determination only if the other state no longer
has or fails to exercise jurisdiction. Id § 1738A(f).
51. In 1968, The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws proposed the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (U.C.C.J.A.),
which commissioners hoped would gain national acceptance and remove a
legal incentive for parents to transport their children across state lines. UNIF.
CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. 117 (1968). The
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federal government to help search for abducted children by
permitting the Department of Justice to issue arrest warrants
for kidnapping parents5 2 and by providing government records,
such as tax records, to help locate abducting parents.s3 Two
U.C.C.J.A., however, is not a reciprocal law and thus was not uniformly
adopted in each state. L. KARP & C. KARP, supra note 15, at 238.
In large measure, the U.C.C.J.A. aims to reverse the impact of May v. An-
derson, 345 U.S. 528 (1938), in which the United States Supreme Court de-
clined to interpret Article IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution to
require full faith and credit in custody disputes. Id at 534. The U.C.C.J.A.
reverses traditional jurisdiction guidelines based on the child's location. UNIF.
CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3(a)(I)(ii), (c) & comment, 9 U.L.A. at
143-44 (1968). The Act accomplishes this through uniform guidelines to deter-
mine which state has the greatest interest in the custody dispute at issue. I&r
§ 3 & comment, 9 U.L.A. at 143-44. Providing a so-called "home state" with
exclusive jurisdiction over custody disputes, id. § 3(a)(ii), 9 U.L.A. at 143, the
Act directs other states to enforce the "home-state" decrees without modifica-
tion. Id §§ 13, 14, 15, 9 U.L.A. at 276, 292, 311. It emphasizes this point by
admonishing courts to refrain from accepting jurisdiction to issue an initial de-
cree or modify another state's decree if the petitioner has wrongfully taken
the child out of state. I&r § 8, 9 U.L.A. at 251. This caused problems because
parents could easily move their children from state to state, and thus more
than one state could assert jurisdiction. Id at prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. at 117.
Thus, "child snatching prior to or after a custody decree was quasi-accepted
behavior, somewhere in the no-man's land of the law." Bodenheimer, Inter-
state Custody: Initial Jurisdiction and Continuing Jurisdiction under the
UCCJA, 14 FAM. L.Q. 203, 203 (1981).
All 50 states and the District of Columbia have now adopted the Act,
largely stripping away the legal incentive to parental kidnapping. See
Bodenheimer, supra, at 226. Bodenheimer asserts that in the case of kid-
napped children, practically no courts will now accept jurisdiction to change
another court's custody determination. I& Despite the U.C.C.J.A., however,
some pre-litigation child kidnappers continue, on occasion, to manage to start
custody actions in a states where grandparents or other relatives live or where
the petitioners lived in the past. i The Act does permit parents to recover
attorney fees, court costs, and travel related expenses if forced to travel out of
state due to the petitioner's wrongful conduct. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURIS-
DICTION ACT § 8(c), 9 U.L.A. 251 (1968).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1988). The kidnapping parent must be charged with
a state felony before the federal government will issue an arrest warrant.
Beach v. Smith, 743 F.2d 1303, 1305 (9th Cir. 1984). Forty-eight of the 50 states
provide felony punishment for kidnapping parents. The two exceptions pro-
vide misdemeanor penalties. C. KARP & L. KARP, supra note 15, at app. J.
The Justice Department was slow to embrace the law and at first required
"independent and credible information that the child was in a condition of se-
rious abuse or neglect" before it would authorize an arrest warrant. Beach,
743 F.2d at 1305. Under congressional pressure, it lifted the abuse require-
ment. Id.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 654 (1988). The Act provides parents of abducted children
with access to the Federal Parent Locator Service, which Congress initially
created to find parents not making court ordered support payments. 42 U.S.C.
§ 653(a) (1988). The service attempts to find absent parents by checking ad-
dress and employee information that the Social Security Administration, In-
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years later, Congress enacted the Missing Children's Act
(MCA),M further expanding the federal government's role in
child abduction cases. The MCA allows local law enforcement
agencies to list descriptions of abducting parents and their miss-
ing children on the National Crime Information Center com-
puter, facilitating return of the missing child if police stop
either the parent or child on an unrelated charge.55
C. MINNESOTA'S RESPONSE TO PARENTAL KIDNAPPING
Although the federal government has sought to help cur-
tail parental kidnapping through the Parental Kidnapping Pre-
vention Act and the Missing Children's Act, jurisdiction over
dissolution matters remains primarily the responsibilities of the
states.s In Minnesota, the legislature first addressed parental
kidnapping in 1963, when it created a felony-level offense for
parents who abduct their children with the intent to interfere
with custody.57 Minnesota's current statute assigns felony pen-
alties for kidnapping a child with the intent to deprive another
of visitation or of custody rights, but the court shall dismiss
the charge if the abducting parent voluntarily returns the child
within two days59 or if the abductor, without leaving Minne-
ternal Revenue Service, the Department of Health and Human Services, the
Department of Labor and other federal departments and agencies retain. I&
§ 653(a)-(b).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1988); P. HOFF, LEGAL REMEDIES IN PARENTAL Kit-
NAPPING CAsES: A COLLECTION OF MATERIALS 18 (1986).
55. P. HOFF, supra note 54, at 18.
56. See Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Under the
"domestic relations" exception, federal courts will not assert diversity jurisdic-
tion over a case that would "require it to grant a divorce, determine alimony
or support obligations, or resolve parental conflicts over their children." Id.
57. Criminal Code of 1963, ch. 753, § 609.26, 1963 Minn. Laws 1185, 1203-04
(1963) (codified at MINN. STAT. § 609.26 (1990)). The Minnesota Supreme
Court upheld the law in the face of a challenge arguing the constitutionality of
criminalizing the kidnapping of one's own child. Olsen v. State, 287 Minn. 536,
538-39, 177 N.W.2d 424, 427 (1970).
In 1967, the Legislature amended the law by also making it a felony to de-
tain one's own child outside Minnesota. Act of May 18, 1967, ch. 570, § 1, 1967
Minn. Laws 1148-49. However, in State v. McCormick, 273 N.W.2d 624 (Minn.
1978), the Minnesota Supreme Court overturned this portion of the statute. It
ruled that the statute sought to punish activities solely outside of Minnesota.
Id. at 626 (quoting People v. Merrill, 2 Parker's Crim. Rep. 590, 603 (1855)). It
also held that the provision violated the equal protection clause of the United
States Constitution by establishing disparate punishment for non-resident par-
ents, without rational basis. Id. at 627.
58. MINN. STAT. § 609.26 subd. 1 (1990).
59. Id at subd. 5(a) (the 1991 Legislature reduced the dismissal period
from two weeks to two days). The required dismissing of charges does not ap-
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sota, brings a custody action in court.60 The statute excuses an
abduction intended to protect the child from physical or sexual
assault or substantial emotional harm.61 Under the statute, a
judge may order restitution to the custodial parent for expenses
incurred in returning the child,62 and also may direct an appro-
priate county welfare agency to provide counseling for the
child.63
In addition to this criminal prohibition, the Minnesota
Supreme Court has interpreted state law to provide trial judges
with "broad discretion to protect custodial and visitation
rights."'' For example, in Tischendorf v. Tischendorf,5 the
supreme court upheld a judge's requirement that a noncus-
todial parent post bond before taking a child overseas for ex-
tended visitation.6 State law further specifies that judges shall
modify custody arrangements to serve the best interests of chil-
dren,6 7 restrict visitation that will endanger the child,68 issue
contempt of court citations to address unwarranted interfer-
ence with visitation,69 order county supervision of custody if
needed,70 and restrain any pre-divorce harassment or mistreat-
ment of children.71 State law also forbids custodial parents
from moving out of state to interfere with the non-custodial
parent's visitation rights.72 The 1991 Legislature directed the
state to distribute a quarterly bulletin with information on
missing children to law enforcement agencies, schools and
ply if the child is returned as a result of intervention by law enforcement offi-
cials. Id.
60. Id- at subd. 5(b).
61. Id. at subd. 2(1). In addition, the law permits abductors to defend
against charges by asserting they took the child to protect themselves from
physical or sexual assault. Id. at subd. 2(2). Consent is also a defense. Id. at
subd. 2(3).
62. Id. at sub& 4.
63. Id. The Minnesota Legislature has also enacted the U.C.C.J.A. MINN.
STAT. § 518A (1990).
64. Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 47 (Minn. 1990).
65. 321 N.W.2d 405 (Minn. 1982), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1037 (1983).
66. Id at 412.
67. MINN. STAT. § 518.175 subd. 5 (1990).
68. Id. at subd. 1.
69. Id at subd. 4.
70. Id. § 518.176 subd. 2.
71. Id. § 518.131(g). The judge may also prohibit either party from remov-
ing the children from the jurisdiction before disposition of the divorce pro-
ceeding. Id. § 518.131(h). The judge may issue contempt of court citations for
violations; prosecutors may also bring misdemeanor charges to punish viola-
tions of the orders. Id.
72. Id. § 518.175(3).
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others.73 The Legislature considered, but did not pass, a mea-
sure that would allow parents to sue child kidnappers for tor-
tiously interfering with their custodial rights.74
D. HISTORY OF TORTIOus INTERFERENCE
The tort of interference with custodial rights descends di-
rectly from the English common law action for trespass75 that
permitted fathers76 to recover for the loss of services a kid-
napped child would have performed for the family.77 Since at
least the mid-1800s, American courts have allowed parents to
sue child kidnappers. 78 Early courts seemed willing to overlook
the proof of service found in the English trespass actions, 79 and
73. 1991 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. § 299C.52(7) (Westlaw, MN-Legis
database). The Legislature directed the state to include photographs of miss-
ing children in the quarterly bulletins. Id- It also urged state and local offi-
cials to include information about missing children in other mailings to the
public. Id. In addition, the law gives law enforcement officials greater access
to medical data about missing children. Id. § 299C.52(9).
74. The bill passed the Senate during the 1991 session but did not come up
for a vote in the House. S.F. 1024, 77th Leg., 1st Sess. (1991). It would provide
joint and several liability to kidnappers and their helpers. Id § 2. It would ex-
cuse third-parties who assist with the kidnapping only if they had no notice of
existing custody orders and should not have known of such orders. Id The
bill would allow defendants to assert affirmative defenses on the basis that the
custodial parent had given them written permission to be with the children
and on the basis that they took the child to prevent imminent physical or sex-
ual abuse. Id § 4. In the latter case, defendants must have promptly filed re-
ports with an appropriate law enforcement agency. Id Plaintiffs under the
proposal could receive damages for expenses incurred locating their children,
enforcing existing court orders and bringing a lawsuit under the proposal, in-
cluding attorney fees. Id § 3. In addition, they may seek payment for mental
suffering. Id The proposal also suggests that courts may order defendants to
reimburse the government for its expenses locating the child. Id
75. See Pickle v. Page, 252 N.Y. 474, 476, 169 N.E. 650, 651 (1930) (recount-
ing the historical foundations of the tort).
76. The common law discriminated sharply against women and allowed
only fathers to bring such actions. Not only could mothers not bring an action
to recover for the abduction of her children, but initially fathers could sue
only over the abduction of an heir - the eldest son. Id- The rationale was
that only men could own property, and only heirs provided property value. Id
77. Id. The Pickle court explained that the common law allowed these ac-
tions only if a father suffered an actual loss of service. Such claims were re-
fused if the child, not an heir, was too young or otherwise incapable of work.
Id Some judges permitted fathers who suffered a loss of service from their
children also to claim damages for the harm the abduction caused their rela-
tionships with their children, but mere harm to family relationships, without
loss of service, did not sustain a cause of action. Id
78. See Magee v. Holland, 27 N.J.L. 86, 88 (1858); Rice v. Nickerson, 91
Mass. 478, 478 (1864); Clark v. Bayer, 32 Ohio St. 299, 301 (1877).
79. See Magee, 27 N.J.L. at 96 (requiring parents to plead a loss of service
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by the turn of the century American courts had discarded the
requirement as an "outworn fiction" masking the real purpose
of the tort.80 The modern view recognizes that the tort serves
to protect the parent-child relationship and that loss of service
is secondary.8'
The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 700, which codi-
fies the tort of custodial interference, 2 also takes the view that
a parent's loss of society with the child, without accompanying
loss of service, is sufficient injury for redress.8 3 Section 700 al-
lows a parent to recover for loss of society, emotional distress,
loss of service, reasonable expenses of regaining custody, and
reasonable expenses incurred in treating the child for physical
and emotional harm suffered.84 The Restatement (Second) lim-
its the scope of the tort. It grants immunity to kidnappers who
rescue children from physical violence inflicted by their par-
ents,a5 and it relieves from liability abducting parents with joint
but saying it may be inferred, even though one of the kidnapped children was
but two-years-old).
80. Howell v. Howell, 162 N.C. 283, 286-87, 78 S.E. 222, 224 (1913) (assert-
ing the real damage of child abduction results from the "destruction of [a]
household").
The Pickle court dealt what probably was the mortal blow to the common
law loss-of-service approach. It said: "It would be a reproach to our legal sys-
tem if, for the abduction of a child in arms, no remedy ran to its parent,
although for a 'parrot, a popinjay, a thrush' and even 'for a dog' an ample rem-
edy is furnished to their custodian for the loss of their possession." Pickle, 252
N.Y. at 482, 169 N.E. at 653 (stating explicitly that "no loss of service be al-
leged or proven").
81. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 924-25 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON];
Annotation, Parental Child Abduction, 49 A.L.R.4th 7 (1986).
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 (1977). The tort was included
in the American Law Institute's first Restatement of Torts in 1938. RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS § 700 (1938).
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 comment d. The Restatement
(Second) creates tort liability to anyone who, without consent, "abducts or
otherwise compels or induces a minor child to leave a parent legally entitled to
its custody or not to return to the parent after it has been left him." Id. § 700.
Neither § 700 nor the comments that follow discuss whether third parties may
be named as defendants in tortious interference cases for assisting a parent ab-
ducting his or her child. Id.
84. Id. at comment g.
85. Id. at comment e. The Comment restricts immunity to situations in
which it "appear[s] reasonably probable that the child is about to suffer imme-
diate harm or that it will be subjected to immediate harm if it returns to its
home." Id-
The Restatement (Second) also grants immunity for inducing a minor to
leave home to marry. Id. at comment f.
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custody because they are, by definition, entitled to custody. 86
Custodial parents bring tortious interference suits for two
reasons: to obtain leverage for the return of a missing child87
and to obtain money damages after a child is returned.88 In the
former case, parents often sue grandparents and other relatives
who know where the child is located. 9 The threat of money
damages, perhaps escalating damages,9o may pressure defend-
ants into cooperating.91 In the latter case, custodial parents
often name the abducting parent and others as defendants.92
In recent years, courts increasingly have accepted the
tort.93 Before the Larson decision, all thirteen state high courts
86. Id. at comment c.
87. A "typical case" is filed while the child is still missing in order to gain
bargaining strength for the child's return. Annotation, supra note 81, at 14. A
good example is Lloyd v. Loeffler, 539 F. Supp. 998 (E.D. Wis.), aff'd, 694 F.2d
489 (7th Cir. 1982) (applying Wisconsin law). In Lloyd, a custodial father
brought suit to regain his abducted one-year-old daughter, alleging that his
former lover, Bonnie McMahan, kidnapped their daughter, Carol Caren Lloyd,
at the conclusion of summer visitation. The father, Kenneth Lloyd, sued Mc-
Mahan; her husband, Earl McMahan; and the child's maternal grandparents,
Irma and Alvin Loeffler. Id at 1000-01. Lloyd was unable to locate the
McMahans, and they did not appear at trial. Id. at 1003.
The United States district court determined that Wisconsin would adopt
the tort because the state has followed other provisions of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts and has made child kidnapping a crime, and because other
states have judicially adopted the tort. I&x at 1004. At trial, evidence showed
that the Loefflers helped the McMahans hide the child by setting up bank ac-
counts, making other financial arrangements, and performing tasks that al-
lowed the couple to remain hidden. Id. at 1001-02. After a bench trial, the
court found the McMahans and the Loefflers jointly and severally liable to
Lloyd for $70,038.45 in compensatory damages. Id. at 1005. Noting that Bonnie
McMahan thrust her parents "in an understandably difficult position" when
she disregarded their advice against kidnapping her daughter, the court re-
lieved the Loefflers of punitive damage liability, but awarded Lloyd punitive
damages from the McMahans of $25,000 plus $2,000 per month until the child
was returned. Id. at 1005.
88. See P. HoFF, INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL CHILD CUSTODY Ds-
PUTES 14-1 (1984) (contending tortious interference provides the greatest
promise for compensating custodian parents to the full extent for the abduc-
tion of their children).
89. Annotation, supra note 81, at 12-15.
90. See Lloyd, 539 F. Supp. at 1005.
91. Snyder, Tortious Interference with Custody - The New Personal In-
jury Suit, 2 AM. J. FAM. L. 51, 54-57 (1988).
92. See Annotation, supra note 81, at 12-14.
93. See DiRuggiero v. Rodgers, 743 F.2d 1009, 1017-18 (3d Cir. 1984) (ap-
plying New Jersey law); Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 495-97 (7th Cir. 1982)
(applying Wisconsin law); Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1044 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (applying D.C. law); Fenslage v. Dawkins, 629 F.2d 1107, 1109-10 (5th
Cir. 1980) (applying Texas law); Kunz v. Deitch, 660 F. Supp. 679, 683 (N.D. Ill.
1987) (applying Illinois law); Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15, 18 (E.D.N.Y.
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that addressed the tort adopted it judicially,94 almost uniformly
without dissent.95 Few of these courts, however, faced argu-
ments that the tort was not in the best interests of children.
The majority of the high court decisions came in cases in which
plaintiffs did not press claims against former spouses. Custo-
1978) (applying New York law); Rosefield v. Rosefield 221 Cal. App. 2d 431,
433-34, 34 Cal. App. Rptr. 479, 481-82 (1963); Howell v. Howell, 162 N.C. 283,
285-86, 78 S.E.2d 222, 223-24 (1913); Coleman v. Shirlen, 53 N.C. App. 573, 281
S.E.2d 431, 433-34 (1981) (using civil conspiracy theory). But see Adra v. Clift,
105 F. Supp. 857, 866-67 (D. Md. 1961) (best interests of child was to remain
with mother, despite violating Lebanese decision awarding custody to father);
Simmons v. Simmons, 41 F. Supp. 545, 548-49 (E.D.S.C. 1941) (holding the tort
would violate domestic felicity); Rayford v. Rayford, 456 So. 2d 833, 834-35
(Ala. Civ. App. 1984) (allowing a mother to recover costs of returning her chil-
dren through contempt proceedings against the father, but disallowing further
damages); Whitehorse v. Critchfield, 144 Ill. App. 3d 192, 194-95, 494 N.E.2d
743, 745 (App. Ct. 1986) (not recognizing the tort); Johns v. Johns, 471 So. 2d
1071, 1076-77 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (holding no damages available for refusal to
comply with custody order); Kipper v. Vokolek, 546 S.W.2d 521, 527 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1977) (tort denied where custody unclear).
In addition, several law reviews have recommended that states adopt the
tort. See Campbell, supra note 15, at 260; Comment, Torts-Punitive Damages-
Escalating Punitive Damages in Cases of Child Abduction - Lloyd v. Loef-
fler, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 191, 204; Comment, In the Best Interest of the Child?
Minnesota's Refusal to Recognize the Tort of Parental Kidnapping: Larson v.
Dunn, 14 HAMLINE L. REv. 257, 274-75 (1991) [hereinafter Comment, Best In-
terest]; Comment, Abduction of Child By Noncustodial Parent: Damages for
Custodial Parent's Mental Distress, 46 Mo. L. REv. 829, 843 (1981); Comment,
supra note 17, at 1009.
Further, one state enacted the tort into statute. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 36 (Vernon 1991). The statute creates liability for taking or retaining a child
in violation of a court order and for assisting in such conduct. Id § 36.02. A
defendant will be relieved of liability, however, for complying with the custody
order after receiving notice of the violation. Id. § 36.04. A defendant may also
recover attorney fees and court costs if the claim was frivolous. Id § 36.08.
94. See D & D Fuller CATV Constr., Inc. v. Pace, 780 P.2d 520, 523-24
(Colo. 1989) (en banc); Shields v. Martin, 109 Idaho 132, 136-38, 706 P.2d 21, 25-
27 (1985); Montgomery v. Crum, 199 Ind. 660, 672-73, 161 N.E. 251, 256-57
(1928) (by implication); Wood v. Wood, 338 N.W.2d 123, 124-25 (Iowa 1983);
Finn v. Lipman, 526 A.2d 1380, 1381-83 (Me. 1987) (declining to reach the issue,
but quoting extensive authority supporting the cause of action); Brown v.
Brown, 338 Mich. 492, 498, 61 N.W.2d 656, 659 (1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 816
(1954); Plante v. Engel, 124 N.H. 213, 216-17, 469 A.2d 1299, 1301-02 (1983);
Pickle v. Page, 252 N.Y. 474, 481-83, 169 N.E. 650, 653 (1930); Howell v. Howell,
162 N.C. 283, 285-87, 78 S.E. 222, 223-24 (1913); Clark v. Bayer, 32 Ohio St. 299,
311-13 (1877); McBride v. Magnuson, 282 Or. 433, 435-36, 578 P.2d 1259, 1260
(1978) (en banc); Bedard v. Notre Dame Hosp., 89 R.I. 195, 197-99, 151 A.2d 690,
691-92 (1959); Silcott v. Oglesby, 721 S.W.2d 290, 292-93 (Tex. 1986).
95. Judges dissented on the question of adoption of the tort only in Wood,
338 N.W.2d at 127-30 (Wolle, J., joined by Harris & McGiverin, JJ., and joined
in part by McCormick, J., dissenting). The dissenters argued that the tort will
become "a new weapon for the arsenal of litigants engaging in marital or post-
marital warfare." Id at 127.
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dial parents directed three of the suits against relatives who
helped to abduct the children,96 two against police officers who
assisted the abductions,97 one against a grandparent who ab-
ducted a child,98 one against an ex-spouse's attorney who alleg-
edly counseled his client to abduct her children,9 one against a
hospital that refused to discharge their infant child,l °° one
against a police officer for wrongly taking a child into protec-
tive custody, 01 and one in which the defendant is unclear.102
An additional suit sought return of a still kidnapped child.103
Only two of the cases resulted from suits in which one parent
sued the other over a child who had returned home.1°4
96. D & D Fuller, 780 P.2d at 521 (suing the child's grandfather); Brown,
338 Mich. at 494, 61 N.W.2d at 657 (suing aunts and uncles); Plante, 124 N.H. at
215-17, 469 A.2d at 1300-02 (suing the child's grandparents) (in dicta, the court
said that it would permit tortious interference suits against abducting parents).
97. Shields, 109 Idaho at 136-38, 706 P.2d at 25-27 (suit against police of-
ficer who helped a mother using an outdated custody order obtain her son
from day care; the custodial father also named the abducting mother as a de-
fendant but she did not appear in person or by counsel); Pickle, 252 N.Y. at
475-76, 169 N.E. at 650-51 (suit against county sheriff who helped a mother ab-
duct her child from his grandparents who had adopted the boy when his
mother abandoned him five years before).
98. Silcott, 721 S.W.2d at 291 (suit against grandparent who allegedly ab-
ducted child from stepparent acting as child's managing conservator, court
adopted tort judicially after noting that Texas legislature enacted similar tort
that became law after this suit arose).
99. Finn v. Lipman, 526 A.2d 1380, 1380-83 (Me. 1987) (summary judgment
affirmed for defendant holding that plaintiff failed to present evidence that
the attorney counseled his client to violate the custody order; the court as-
sumed Maine would adopt the custodial interference tort in an appropriate
case); see also McEvoy v. Helikson, 277 Or. 781, 787-89, 562 P.2d 540, 543-44
(1977) (recognizing custody rights in suit by custodial father against his ex-
wife's attorney for returning her passport to her in violation of a court order,
enabling her to flee with the children to Switzerland).
100. Bedard v. Notre Dame Hosp., 89 R.I. 195, 196-97, 151 A.2d 690, 691
(1959).
101. McBride v. Magnuson, 282 Or. 433, 435, 578 P.2d 1259, 1259-60 (1978)
(en banc) (mother sued police officer who took eight-month-old child into pro-
tective custody after the child suffered burns).
102. Clark v. Bayer, 32 Ohio St. 299, 299-304, 312 (1877). In C/ark, the Ohio
Supreme Court permitted a custodial grandfather to bring perhaps the earliest
example of a pure custodial rights case. Id. at 310-13. Clark sued Bayer, the
alleged abductor, but the decision does not identify the defendant's relation to
the children, other than to identify him as someone other than the father. Id.
at 299-304.
103. Howell v. Howell, 162 N.C. 283, 283-84, 78 S.E. 222, 222-23 (1913) (cus-
todial father sues non-custodial mother and her father for return of his six-
year-old daughter; suit seeks monetary damages only from the grandfather).
104. Wood v. Wood, 338 N.W.2d 123, 123 (Iowa 1983) (discussed infra notes
105-11 and accompanying text); Montgomery v. Crum, 199 Ind. 660, 664-67, 161
N.E. 251, 254-55 (1928) (custodial mother sued noncustodial father who twice
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Unlike the other high courts, the Iowa Supreme Court, in
Wood v. Wood,10 5 engaged in vigorous debate on whether to
adopt tortious interference.1°6 Wood, a lawsuit between par-
ents, arose after the non-custodial father kidnapped his child
from his ex-wife and kept the child for a little more than a
month.10 7 The child had returned home when the custodial
mother pressed her suit. 08 Looking at broad policy goals, the
court concluded that adopting the tort as outlined in the Re-
statement (Second) would help to speed the return of kid-
napped children by encouraging cooperation of third-party
defendants and allowing aggressive use of civil discovery
tools.1' 9 The majority also found that the threat of damages
would deter parents from kidnapping their children.110 The
dissent, however, concluded that the tort would foster "pro-
longed bitterness among family members resulting from jury
verdicts, whether damages be collected or denied.""'
II: LARSON V. DUNN: MINNESOTA BUCKS THE TREND
Less than two-years-old when her parents separated, Jes-
sica Larson was caught in the middle of a nasty divorce.1 2 Lo-
ree Dunn, Jessica's mother, claimed her husband, John Larson,
physically abused her" 3 and sexually abused Jessica."14 Larson
kidnapped his children, the second instance occurring after he received a par-
don from his prison term for the first kidnapping, to receive the pardon, the
non-custodial father promised not to interfere with his children).
105. 338 N.W.2d 123 (Iowa 1983).
106. Wood, 338 N.W.2d at 127 (Wolle, J., joined by Harris & McGiverin,
JJ., and joined in part by McCormick, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 123.
108. Id.
109. rd at 127.
110. I&
111. Id. at 129 (Wolle, J., joined by Harris & McGiverin, JJ., and joined in
part by McCormick, J., dissenting). The minority also said that the tort may
result in families spending large amounts of money on attorney fees and court
costs, money that could be better spent raising the children. I. In addition,
the minority was concerned that there may be no limit to the litigation, noting
defendant parents might countersue for visitation violations. Id.
112. Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 41 (Minn. 1990).
113. Affidavit of Loree Carol Larson Dunn at 1-3, Larson v. Dunn, 460
N.W.2d 39 (Minn. 1990) (C7-89-1139). In her affidavit, filed after she was ar-
rested for kidnapping Jessica, Dunn claims that Larson controlled her through
"physical, emotional and sexual violence." I. at 1. Even before they were
married, he often hit her. Id. at 1-3. Sometimes he grabbed her arms so tight
he left "bruises that looked like the prints of his hands." Id- at 1. Dunn also
claimed the violence continued during her pregnancy with Jessica and after
her birth. Id.
114. Id- at 4-5. Dunn claims that Larson often examined Jessica's genital
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responded by calling his wife a liar.115 He won a custody dis-
pute over Jessica in part by persuading a family court judge
that Dunn fabricated her claims of violence. 1 6
The day after the judge awarded him custody Larson went
to retrieve Jessica." 7 Dunn's father, Franklin Rigenhagen, told
Larson that Dunn and Jessica had fled the state." 8 Larson im-
mediately called the police and officers issued an arrest war-
rant for Dunn.1 9 Despite spending $50,000 searching for his
daughter, 20 Larson neither saw nor heard from Jessica for the
next seven years.' 21 During that time, the Rigenhagens
claimed they did not know where Dunn and Jessica had
gone.12 2
The FBI found Dunn living a new life in Washington state
and returned Jessica to Larson.12s After her return, Larson ini-
tiated suit.'24 He claimed Dunn had abducted Jessica, that the
region. Id at 4. When Jessica was old enough to crawl, Dunn said that Larson
encouraged her to fondle his penis. Id at 4-5. She said Larson responded to
her objections by claiming he wanted to prevent Jessica from "growing up to
be gay." I& at 5.
115. In Re Marriage of Larson and Larson, No. C-21-41, slip op. at 3 (Mar-
tin County Nov. 5, 1980) (order granting divorce).
116. Id at 3 (asserting Dunn "tends to lie").
117. Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 41 (Minn. 1990). Larson had at-
tempted to pick up Jessica the day the custody decree was issued, a scheduled
visitation period for him. Larson v. Dunn, 449 N.W.2d 751, 752 (Minn. Ct.
App.), rev'd, 460 N.W.2d 39 (Minn. 1990). Dunn's father, Franklin Rigenhagen,
refused to surrender the child. Id He told Larson that his permanent custody
would begin the next day, and he slammed the door on Larson's hand. I& at
753.
118. Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 41. Dunn claims that she left Minnesota on her
attorney's advice, before the permanent custody award took effect. Id. at 42.
119. Larson, 449 N.W.2d at 753.
120. 1d Five years after Dunn and Jessica disappeared, the FBI informed
Larson that his ex-wife had initially stayed with an aunt in California and that
the Rigenhagens had helped them move. Id. Based on this information, Lar-
son filed suit in federal court, but he dropped the action when Dunn's family
continued to deny knowing her whereabouts, and the FBI refused to testify
during an ongoing investigation. Id.
121. Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 41.
122. Id. at 41-42.
123. Id at 42.
124. Id- Larson alleged that after Jessica returned, she told him that the
Rigenhagens and other maternal relatives had frequently visited her in Wash-
ington. Larson, 449 N.W.2d at 753. Dunn's new, and subsequently estranged
husband, Paul Dunn, also provided Larson with an affidavit making the same
allegations. Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 42.
Since the time that Jessica was reunited with Larson, she has not had any
contact with her mother. Id at 46.
In a tape recorded telephone conversation with Larson and his new wife,
Dunn apologized for keeping Larson from his daughter for so long. Respon-
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Rigenhagens and other relatives had helped to hide her,125 and
that despite their claims of ignorance about Dunn's wherea-
bouts, the Rigenhagens visited their daughter frequently.126
The suit asked for compensatory damages for intentionally in-
terfering with his custodial rights.127 The district court noted
that Minnesota had not adopted a custodial interference tort
and dismissed Larson's claims for failure to state a claim.M2
The Court of Appeals reversed in a 2-1 decision, determining
that custodial parents have "legally protectable right[s] to
maintain relationships with their children."'29
A divided Minnesota Supreme Court, however, declined to
examine the custodial interference tort in the context of tradi-
dent's Brief and Appendix at A-38, Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39 (Minn.
1990) (C7-89-1139). She offered to provide Larson with pictures of Jessica so
he could, in a very small way, observe portions of the missing years. She said:
I can't make it up to you. I can't take it back. I want you to under-
stand why I left, what was going though my head .... I'm tired of
games. I don't care if I've not convinced you. Maybe it's better. There
are specific people out there that want me to do all these terrible
things to you guys. I'm not gonna do it. You're her daddy. You're
her new mommy. I'm not doin' it, ok. Now if you guys want to barbe-
cue me at the stake, fine, go ahead.
125. Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 41-42.
126. Larson, 449 N.W.2d at 753.
127. Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 42. Larson's suit also alleged intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, fraud, and civil conspiracy. Id-
128. Larson v. Dunn, No. 46-C-88-1312, slip op. at 2 (Martin County Feb. 17,
1989).
129. Larson, 449 N.W.2d at 753. The majority held that the public policy of
Minnesota favored adoption of the new tort. It concluded-
While we are reluctant to add another weapon to the arsenal already
available for use by family members against one another, we think
the custody decree vests the custodial parent with a legally protect-
able interest in a relationship with the child. The tort of intentional
interference with custodial rights is an appropriate means of remedy-
ing interference with that relationship.
Id at 758.
A dissenting opinion by Judge Doris Huspeni also focused on public pol-
icy. Id. at 760-61 (Huspeni, J., dissenting). Huspeni warned that adoption of
the new tort could do more harm than good:
Today not only are courts making anguishing decisions in countless
marital dissolution actions involving minor children, but they are cau-
tioned by thoughtful voices both inside and outside the judicial system
that courts of law are not particularly well-suited to resolve family re-
lationship issues and perhaps alternative fora should be explored. Ill-
considered adoption of the tort of intentional interference with custo-
dial relations could provide a vehicle through which many of the most
divisive and psychologically and financially draining aspects of marital





tional tort analysis.130 Instead, the majority shaped the discus-
sion in terms of family law,131 borrowing the standard used to
make custody determinations. Under that analysis, the court
concluded that it would not be in Jessica's "best interests" to
allow her father to pursue a cause of action against her
mother. 32 The court concluded the new tort would, once
again, place the child in the middle of a bitter family dispute,la 3
possibly requiring relitigation of original custody determina-
tions.'3 Such a tort, it concluded, "could be used as a weapon
for revenge and continued hostility."' Thus, it held that the
tort failed to meet Minnesota's public policy objectives of pro-
tecting children.136
Although the dissenting justices asserted that the tort
might encourage the return of kidnapped children, 3 7 the ma-
jority court questioned the need for another such tool.In The
majority stated that the tort would not deter intrafamilial kid-
napping because "family ties are stronger than the fear of
money damages."' 3 9 In addition, Minnesota law already pro-
130. See Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 45.
131. Id.
132. 1I at 46-47.
133. Id. at 46. The majority said evidence is piling up that children can be
devastated by divorce and subsequent family strife. Id at 45. A new lawsuit
addressing many of the same issues as the earlier divorce action would "dupli-
cate the ambivalence and dislocation of the dissolution itself." Id at 46. The
majority concluded:
For the good of our children, the law should seek to promote such
harmony as is possible in families fractured by the dissolution process.
At a minimum, the law should not provide a means of escalating in-
trafamily warfare.... The interest in compensation should not out-
weigh the effects of bitter accusations on young children.
Id at 45-46.
134. Id
135. Id at 47.
136. See id. The dissenting justices argued, however, that a child's best in-
terests are served "by encouraging the return of absent children by imposing a
civil damages remedy." I& at 52 (Popovich, C.J., joined by Yetka & Kelley,
JJ., dissenting).
137. Id. The dissenters also argued that tort liability is appropriate to pre-
vent a parent from exercising self-help measures in contravention of court or-
ders, id at 48, that the tort will not add significantly to deteriorating family
relationships since the relationships have already broken down, id-, and that
the costs of a parent's search for a child should be compensated, id at 51.
138. Id at 47.
139. Id. The court said Minnesota already provides other mechanisms in
law to prevent child kidnapping. Among them are the possible deterrent ef-
fects provided by the felony prohibitions against child snatching. Id (citing
MINN. STAT. § 609.26 (1990)). In addition, family law gives trial judges broad
discretion to use contempt of court citations in cases of unwarranted denial of
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vided for punishment and redress through criminal statutes.1 40
Rather than fill gaps in the law, the court held this new tort
would duplicate other legal avenues and could have a detrimen-
tal impact on the innocent children that family law was
designed to protect.'4 ' The court concluded by warning that
the tort "may profoundly and permanently affect the relation-
ships between children, their parents, grandparents, aunts and
uncles" and thus should not be adopted without detailed
study..42
III: A WORKABLE SOLUTION
A. LARsON GOES ONLY PART WAY
The Larson court's focus on the welfare of kidnapped chil-
dren represents an important step in the evolution of the tort
of custodial interference.143 Originally conceived to protect a
father's pecuniary interests in his heir, the tort now protects
the relationship interests of custodial parents, whether mothers
or fathers.' 44 With the current divorce climate, parents often
bring claims under the tort when their former spouses abduct
their children. 45 The Minnesota Supreme Court's Larson deci-
sion, however, recognizes a sad irony: This tort that protects
visitation rights. I& (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.175(4) (1988)). Family
court judges also may require a parent to post bond to guarantee children will
not be removed from Minnesota. Id. (citing Tischendorf v. Tischendorf, 321
N.W.2d 405, 412 (Minn. 1982)).
140. I at 46. The court noted that MINN. STAT. § 609.26 provides for re-
dress. The criminal statute allows the trial judge to impose costs incurred by
the custodial parent in locating the child. The court noted that in addition to
being convicted of child kidnapping, Dunn has also been punished by her sepa-
ration from Jessica since her arrest. Id- She has not even been allowed to
have visitation with her in that time. In dicta, the court also said the most
egregious cases of custodial interference can proceed under a theory of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. I&i (recognizing intentional infliction of
emotional distress as set forth in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 46(1)
(1965) (citing Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, 330 N.W.2d 428, 438-40 (Minn.
1983))).
141. See id at 47.
142. Id.
143. The Larson court acknowledged that its decision broke from the trend
in other states. Id at 44-45.
144. See supra notes 75-92 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution
of the tort).
145. See supra notes 26-48 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the
parental kidnapping grows out of the large numbers of divorces today and the
accompanying frequent custody battles); see also supra notes 87, 89-91, 112 and




the relationship between one parent and child can become a
sword severing the relationship between the other parent and
child.14
Faced with a suit between parents over a kidnapped child
who had returned home, the Larson court observed that tor-
tious interference claims, like custody proceedings, place
children in the maelstrom of emotional, intrafamilial contro-
versies. 147 The court concluded that, in tort litigation between
parents, as in custody proceedings, the child's interests are par-
amount.14s Because in this instance Jessica Larson had spent
too many years caught in the crossfire of her parents' disputes,
her interests demanded family peace and stability.149 The court
found that Jessica's interests overshadowed her father's other-
wise legitimate claims for redress.15°
In Larson, the Supreme Court's rejection of the tort ad-
vanced the court's objective of protecting kidnapped children
from further damage. If Jessica Larson were still missing, how-
ever, rejecting the tort would not have served the court's pur-
pose.15' In situations where the child is still missing, the "best
146. Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 44-47. The court likened the tort to a claim for
alienation of a child's affections, id. at 46, a cause of action the legislature abol-
ished out of concern for grave abuses. Bock v. Lindquist, 278 N.W.2d 326, 327-
28 (Minn. 1979). The Bock court complained that the child at the center of that
lawsuit had become "the object of intrafamily controversy and, indeed, a pawn
in disputes over monetary matters." Id. The court said in divorce cases the
tort "would exacerbate unhappy relationships and become a strategic tool for
advantageous use of one family member over another." Id. at 328. Like the
Larson court, the Bock court noted that family members may seek to correct
violations of custody orders through contempt-of-court motions, or even
habeas corpus proceedings. Id. The court also believed that parents should be
able to maintain actions in tort against "a stranger who meretriciously in-
trudes into a family relationship." Id.
147. See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
148. Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 45. The court noted that 25 years of family law
litigation teaches that when the welfare and best interests of children are in-
tertwined with the rights of their parents, it is more important to consider the
children's interests. Id.
149. IM at 46. Loree Dunn also seemed to agree that the family's healing
should begin. See supra note 125 (quoting Dunn's statement that she wants
the family to provide support for Jessica).
150. See Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 45-47. The trauma may be even more acute
in tort actions than in dissolution cases because the defendant parent may suf-
fer extreme financial hardship. Wood v. Wood, 338 N.W.2d 123, 129 (Iowa
1983) (Wolle, J., Harris & McGiverin, JJ., dissenting) (asserting that the "par-
ents' continuing internecine struggle" will exhaust money needed for raising
children). Additionally, insurance exclusions for intentional acts are likely to
exclude parental kidnapping from coverage. See Annotation, Insurance - In-
tended or Expected Injury, 31 A.L.R.4th 957 (1986).
151. See Wood, 338 N.W.2d at 127 (asserting that a tort suit will help speed
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interest" of the child is not to remain kidnapped. 5 2 Use of the
tort gives parents searching for missing children great leverage
over third parties, such as grandparents, who may know where
the children is located.153 By rejecting the tort completely, the
Minnesota Supreme Court discarded a valuable tool for locating
still missing kidnapped children.
The proposal pending in the Minnesota Legislature would
restore that tool in Minnesota by overturning the Larson deci-
sion.154 While reversing the detrimental impact of Larson, the
bill ignores Larson's strength because it fails to protect children
who have returned home from the emotional turmoil that liti-
gation causes. A few limitations would accomplish this,L5 5 but
just as courts that previously have addressed tortious interfer-
ence claims, supporters in the Legislature have approached the
issue in an all or nothing fashion.156 Like the Larson court and
other courts, they see a choice of either allowing a parent to sue
the return of a missing child in part by coercing better cooperation from po-
tential third party defendants).
152. See Politte v. Politte, 727 S.W.2d 198, 200-01 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (stat-
ing that "[t]he interests of the child kept by one parent in violations of a court
decree are best served by a prompt return of the child to the parent who the
court had determined to be the more qualified custodian").
153. See supra notes 87, 89-91 and accompanying text (describing use of the
tort for this purpose).
154. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing the proposed
legislation).
155. The proposal would relieve defendants of liability if they take the
child with written permission, or if they do so because of imminent physical or
sexual abuse and they promptly notify appropriate law enforcement officials.
S.F. 1024, 77th Leg., 1st Sess. (1991). The bill would provide parents with no
other affirmative defenses and is stricter than the state criminal statute, which
relieves parents of felony punishment if they return their children within two
days. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
156. In contrast with Larson's total rejection of the tort, Plante v. Engel,
124 N.H. 213, 469 A.2d 1299 (1983), exemplifies a decision accepting the tort
without any limitation. In Plante, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
adopted the tort in a lawsuit brought by a custodial father against his former
mother- and father-in-law for assisting his ex-wife in kidnapping their two
children. I& at 215, 469 A.2d at 1300. He had since found and recovered the
children, and he then brought a tortious interference suit against his children's
grandparents for helping with the abduction. Id. In a 13-paragraph decision,
the New Hampshire Supreme Court relied on the significance that state law
affords the parent-child relationship and determined that parents should be
fully compensated for any intentional interference with their custodial rela-
tionships. The court found "no reason to circumscribe this cause of action
either by including only non-parents, or by excluding them." Id. at 217, 469
A.2d at 1302. Although the court noted that the Restatement (Second) pro-
vides a cause of action for custodial interference, it did not address any of the
affirmative defenses the Restatement (Second) suggests. Id.
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the responsible parties for full damages, including punitive
damages, or preventing the parent from bringing any action at
all.157 Such all or nothing approaches, however, fail to satisfy
the public policy goal of providing consistent protection for
children, whether they are still missing or have returned home.
Because of the delicate nature of family relationships, 15s policy
makers must consider the particular fact situations in order to
promote consistent public policy goals.
B. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
The state should exercise its full power to find and return
kidnapped children. In the process, however, it should not
harm the very children it seeks to protect by placing them in
the center of bitter litigation between their parents. The custo-
dial interference tort proposed below represents a compromise
that meets both of these objectives. This tort would allow par-
ents to use state courts to sue third parties, including relatives,
who may know where their kidnapped children are,159 but it
prohibits parents from using the courts to sue each other.160
Recognizing that the primary tortfeasor, when a parent, may be
relieved of all damages, the proposal limits third-party liability
to defendants who refuse to cooperate with efforts to locate and
to return kidnapped children.161
157. The Larson court acknowledged that it was taking an all-or-nothing
approach but suggested that the Minnesota Supreme Court was not the appro-
priate institution for undertaking the study necessary for determining the
scope of the tort and the extent of its damages. Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d
39, 47 (Minn. 1990).
158. Tort suits between family members have proven to be one of the most
difficult areas of the law. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 81, § 901. Until the
1960s, few courts allowed spouses to sue each other in tort. I& This inter-
spousal immunity stemmed from notions that husbands and wives comprised
single legal units, that actions between them would cause marital disharmony,
and that where insurance is available there is a potential for fraudulent
claims. Id § 902. These rationale are now discredited. All states have ap-
proved Married Women's Property Acts to secure separate legal identities for
women. I& Marital disharmony is not a concern if insurance will pay, see
Baudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 371, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420 (1969) (abolishing
interspousal immunity in Minnesota), and the claims present no greater poten-
tial for fraud than do many other types of actions. PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 81, § 901.
159. See infra Proposed Statute subd. 1(c).
160. See infra id. at subd. 2(a).
161. See infra id at subd. 1(c).
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PROPOSED STATUTE: TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH
CUSTODIAL RIGHTS ACr
1 62
Subd. 1. Prohibited acts. Whoever intentionally does any of
the following acts may be liable for damages for interfering
with custodial rights of another:
(a) takes, obtains, retains or fails to return a minor child from or to
the parent in violation of a court order, where the action
manifests an intent substantially to deprive that parent of rights
to custody; or
(b) takes, obtains, retains or fails to return a minor child from or to
a parent after commencement of an action relating to child cus-
tody but prior to the issuance of an order determining custody,
where the action manifests an intent substantially to deprive
that parent of parental rights; or
(c) knowingly assists in taking, obtaining, retaining or failing to re-
turn a minor child from or to a parent in violation of either (a)
or (b) above, unless within 60 days of being served with a suit
under this act, the actor makes reasonable efforts to locate and
return the child or children who were taken to deprive a parent
of custodial rights.
Subd. 2. Defenses. No person is liable under subd. 1 if:
(a) the actor is the child's parent;
(b) the action is taken to protect the child from physical or sexual
assault or substantial emotional harm;
(c) the action is taken to protect the person taking the action from
physical or sexual assault;
(d) is consented to by the parent, stepparent, or legal custodian
bringing the cause of action; or
(e) is otherwise authorized by a court order issued prior to the viola-
tion of subd. 1.
Subd. 3. Venue. A person who violates this section may be
named as a defendant in a suit brought either in the county in
which the child was taken, concealed or detained, or in the
county of lawful residence of the child.
Subd. 4. Damages. Damages are permitted as follows:
(a) Actual costs and expenses incurred in locating the child;
(b) Actual costs and expenses incurred in returning the child;
(c) Actual costs and expenses, including attorney's fees, expended in
enforcing a court order that was violated;
162. The proposal is based on the prohibitions and defenses contained in
MINN. STAT. § 609.26 (1990), the Minnesota child kidnapping criminal statute.
The criminal law also forbids interference with visitation rights, but such an
interference is not included as a cause of action under this civil proposal. The
primary reason for excluding a visitation right tort is the potential for abuse
by litigants. Unlike in the criminal setting where the discretion of a third
party observer, the prosecutor, can limit frivolous claims of visitation interfer-




(d) Actual costs and expenses, including those expected to be in-
curred, obtaining reasonable medical and reasonable psychologi-
cal treatment of injuries suffered by the child while away;
(e) The value of loss of society of the child during the time custodial
parent and child were separated, except that loss of society dam-
ages shall not be available if the child is returned before trial
begins;
(f) The value of emotional pain and suffering resulting from the par-
ent and child being separated, except that emotional pain and
suffering damages shall not be available if the child is returned
before trial begins;
(g) Punitive damages are available to plaintiff at the discretion of
the judge if the defendant acted with reckless disregard or intent
to cause harm to the plaintiff, except that punitive damages shall
not be available if the child is returned before trial begins.
C. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSAL
The primary objective of this proposal is to balance the
public policy goals of helping custodial parents locate a missing
child while avoiding the harm of allowing parents another fo-
rum in which to act out their hostilities at the child's expense.
Consistent with these goals, the proposed statute permits access
to the courts only in appropriate situations and to appropriate
litigants. 163
1. Short-term kidnapping
A vast majority of parental kidnappers return their chil-
dren to the custodial parents after relatively short periods, al-
most always within a matter of days.164 Often the custodial
parents knows his or her child's location.le5 Although short-
term kidnapping is wrong, making it tortious will spark a flood
of litigation and only add to the pain of a family struggling with
divorce.166 Further, other legal mechanisms such as contempt
163. Under the proposal, strangers who kidnap a child could be liable for
the full amount of damages. One Minnesota commentator has taken the oppo-
site view of this Comment and argued that the Minnesota legislature should
repeal Larson and allow parents to sue each other as well as strangers. See
Comment, Best Interest, supra note 93, at 274-76.
164. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text (demonstrating must pa-
rental kidnappings are short lived).
165. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
166. Similarly, some states have been reluctant to adopt a tort for interfer-
ence with visitation rights because of a concern about permitting "claims for
petty infractions" that would not be in a child's best interests. See Gleiss v.
Newman, 141 Wis. 2d 379, 381, 415 N.W.2d 845, 846-47 (Ct. App. 1978). In
Gleiss, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals distinguished the custodial interference
claims brought in Lloyd v. Loeffler, 539 F. Supp. 998 (E.D. Wis.), qff'd, 694
F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982), see supra note 88, with Gleiss's claims by raising con-
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proceedings 167 and criminal charges1 68 better address short-
term kidnappings. The proposed statute recognizes that al-
lowing use of the tort in short term kidnappings by family
members would not further its purposes. 169 It thus limits suits
over parental kidnappings to those abductions that continue for
more than 60 days.170
2. No parental liability
The proposal is likely to receive the most significant criti-
cism for relieving the principal actor in many kidnappings, the
parent, of any liability. 17' Some will argue that this proposal
misses an opportunity to deter parental kidnapping. It is un-
likely, however, that the possibility of tort litigation will have
much of a deterrent effect. As the Minnesota Supreme Court
noted, "family ties are stronger than the fear of money dam-
cerns about the "trifling" nature of the visitation claims. Gleiss, 141 Wis. 2d at
380, 415 N.W.2d at 846.
The leading case supporting a tort for interference with visitation rights is
Ruffalo v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 706 (W.D. Mo. 1984), in which a mother
was denied all visitation rights with her child after the father and the child
changed identities under the federal Witness Protection Program, id. at 713.
Ruffalo, however, was not followed by Politte v. Politte, 727 S.W.2d 198 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1987), which concluded that parents already had enough weapons at
their disposal for conducting "post-marital warfare." I& at 201.
167. See MINN. STAT. § 518.131 subd. 1(f) (1990) (permitting a judge to or-
der one or both divorcing spouses to stop harassing, mistreating or restraining
the liberty of any children); i4& § 518.131 subd. 1(g) (permitting a judge to re-
strain one or both divorcing spouses from removing their minor children from
the jurisdiction); see also id. § 518.131 subd. 10 (authorizing a judge to issue
contempt citations for violations of subdivisions 1(f) and (g) and also authoriz-
ing misdemeanor penalties).
168. MINN. STAT. § 609.26 (1990).
169. Similarly, Minnesota criminal law recognizes that short-term episodes
are less serious by requiring prosecutors to reduce felony kidnapping charges
to misdemeanor levels if abducting parents return their children within two
days of charges being filed. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. Fur-
ther, prosecutors exercise their own judgment about which cases to bring, thus
providing a gate that restricts criminal charges to more serious allegations.
170. Under the proposal, kidnapping parents cannot be held liable under
subdivision 2(a). Under subdivision 1(c), defendants who assist the kidnap-
ping, or who help hide the child, may be held liable only if they fail to make a
reasonable effort to locate or return the child within sixty days after service of
the lawsuit. Their help returning the child will be unnecessary in kidnappings
shorter than sixty days, and thus there can be no liability for short-term
kidnappings within a family. The proposal, however, does not limit liability
from non-parent kidnappers, whether the abduction be short-lived or long
term.
171. See supra Proposed Statute subd. 2(a).
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ages. '172 In fact, the law already seeks to deter parental kid-
napping by providing felony level punishment for offenses173
and by making contempt of court a possibility.174
Further, not permitting tortious interference suits between
parents is worthwhile even if such actions had deterrent value.
Since the turn of the century, courts that recognized tortious
interference as a cause of action have recognized that its pur-
pose is to protect the parent-child relationship.1 5 Hence, it
makes little sense to protect the child's relationship with one
parent with a tort that invades the same child's relationship
with the other parent. As the Minnesota Supreme Court noted,
litigation can greatly harm children.176
Moreover, simply because parents may not be named as de-
fendants in civil suits does not mean the law will not deal with
them for kidnapping their children. Prosecutors may charge
them with criminal offenses, and judges may sentence them to
jail for kidnapping their children.177 Family court judges may
sanction them with contempt of court penalties and may limit
access to their children.178
3. Third-party liability
In Minnesota, parents of abducted children have no re-
course against third-parties who knowingly help kidnap their
children. Third-parties are rarely subject to the criminal law
sanctions' 7 9 or family court jurisdiction. In many cases, they
are relatives of the abducting parent and maintain contact with
him or her.8 0 The proposal gives custodial parents leverage
172. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (quoting Minnesota
Supreme Court decision).
173. MINN. STAT. § 609.26 (1990).
174. See supra note 167.
175. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
177. MiNN. STAT. § 609.26 (1990).
178. See supra note 167.
179. Prosecutors in the state's two most populated counties say that they
are reluctant to charge third parties with aiding and abetting child abduction
because of the difficulty in proving such charges. Telephone interview with
Kate McPherson, Legal Services Specialist with the Criminal Division of the
Hennepin County Attorney's Office (June 4, 1991) [hereinafter McPherson in-
terview]; Telephone interview with Anne Hyland, Head of Juvenile Family Vi-
olence Division of the Ramsey County Attorney's Office (Apr. 10, 1986)
[hereinafter Hyland interview]. Hennepin County prosecutors occasionally
have brought such charges, McPherson interview, supra, but Ramsey County
prosecutors never have, Hyland interview, supra.
180. See supra note 166 (discussing the Lloyd case in Wisconsin).
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over assisting third-parties by overruling that portion of the
Larson decision that gives third-parties, as it does parents, im-
munity from suit for interfering with custody. Recognizing
that subdivision 2(a) immunizes a parent from liability for ab-
ducting his or her child, the proposal also does not attach liabil-
ity to the third party for the abduction. itself. Instead,
subdivision 1(c) states that third parties may be held liable only
if they fail, in a timely manner, to cooperate with efforts to lo-
cate and return kidnapped children.""' The tort thus provides
relatives with incentive to use their influence to reunite family
members by eliminating their liability if they make reasonable
efforts to locate the abducting parents within two months of
the litigation's commencement. Similarly, the reasonable effort
requirement will allow a neighbor or some other third party
who may have assisted the kidnapper to escape liability by
showing that he or she does not know how to locate the kidnap-
per and the missing child.
Further, the proposal seeks to minimize a third party's
damages if the child has been returned, even without the third
party's help, before the beginning of trial. The proposal does so
by limiting available damages to out-of-pocket expenses in-
curred in returning the child.'8 2 Because Minnesota criminal
and family law also allows awarding such costs, 8 3 the damages
may not even be available in the tort case because of state law
prohibitions on collateral source payments. 8 4
CONCLUSION
The problem of parental kidnapping in the United States
remains serious even though Congress and state legislators
have enacted laws to prevent it and to provide for the return of
abducted children. Additional measures, such as a tort for in-
terfering with custodial rights, will be helpful in Minnesota, but
only as a reasoned response to the problem. This Comment
181. Similarly, TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 36.04 (Vernon 1989) provides an af-
firmative defense for returning a child upon notice of a violation. See supra
note 93 (discussing the Texas statute).
182. See supra Proposed Statute subd. 4(e), (f) & (g).
183. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (describing Minnesota
criminal and family law provisions). Minnesota law permits judges to require
custody violators to pay necessary travel and other expenses, including attor-
ney fees, for coming to Minnesota to enforce a decree from another state.
MINN. STAT. § 518A.15(2) (1990).
184. MINN. STAT. § 548.36 (1990) (preventing plaintiffs from recovering
twice for the same injury).
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proposes the Minnesota Legislature adopt a custodial interfer-
ence tort, and proposes a model statute. The statute balances
the sensitive nature of family relationships by protecting a
child's relationship with both parents, yet also advancing the
public policy goal of returning missing children to their custo-
dial parents. It achieves this goal by focusing liability in paren-
tal kidnapping on third parties who refuse to cooperate with
efforts to find and return kidnapped children. Thus, further
litigation by parents over their children will be prohibited in
order to protect the parent-child relationship, but custodial par-
ents whose children have been kidnapped will gain an addi-
tional and much needed tool for locating previously unfindable
children.
Daniel Oberdorfer
